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LAW FOR A WORLD . COMMUNITY
John Quigley*
Changes in international relations are creating a context for a
new role for law. The danger of destruction through nuclear war or,
increasingly, through environmental spoliation, has lent a sense of
urgency to the search for new measures. The exigencies of survival
require solutions that can be achieved only at a supranational
level. States have shown a greater willingness to seek such solutions, and non-state actors are increasingly taking a role to bring
them about.
In the process, international law is being transformed from a
law between and among states to a law that includes international
organizations, individual persons, corporations, and other nonstate groups. It is moving from a set of negative prohibitions that
sought to keep states from injuring each other by acts of violence
to a set of positive obligations to preserve and improve life for all.
Law is shifting from being an interstate law to a law for a world
community.
In the 1980s a new factor opened greater vistas for the emergence of a world community capable of confronting the survival
issues. This factor was the beginning of an end to the Cold War
that had hindered international cooperation on a wide range of issues. This article examines the trend towards the creation of a
world community law that is reflected in important changes that
have occurred in international law to meet the survival challenge,
and others that have resulted from the ending of the Cold War.
I.

THE DIMINUTION OF THE COLD WAR

Marx's criticism of capitalism introduced a split among the
major powers. The implementation of that criticism in Russia, like
the introduction of a free market and liberal democracy in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe, divided states
into two camps. Unified goals for an international community
could not be achieved while that division continued. The Cold War
that developed from this division kept the world community from
addressing common problems in a collective fashion.
At mid-century, superpower conflict dominated international
relations, with the U.S.S.R. arrayed against the United States. As
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colonial territories became independent in the 1960s and 1970s, a
South-North conflict superimposed itself on the East-West. The
South-North conflict in marginal ways overtook the East-West
conflict, but the East-West conflict remained a prominent feature.
In the United Nations Security Council, U.S.-Soviet rivalry remained a key factor, though more frequently it became the United
States that was alone among the five permanent members, and
therefore, exercised a veto rather than, as earlier, the U.S.S.R.
Developments in the 1980s presaged a path towards the healing of the division. The superpowers reduced the level of their mutual hostility. The initiative came from the Soviet Union, though
the United States claimed that the initiative was a response to its
own high levels of military spending and its use of military force
during the early 1980s.
Whatever the origin, the Soviet Union espoused a revised view
of East-West relations that emphasized peaceful collaboration over
military preparedness. 1 Calling "confrontation" in U.S.-U.S.S.R.
relations "an anomaly," 2 the Soviet Communist Party said that the
Soviet Union's relations with the West did not have to be based on
class struggle. 3 Previously, it said that the Soviet government represented the proletariat, that Western governments represent~d
the bourgeoisie, and that the two were on a collision course. 4 "The
struggle of two opposing systems is no longer the tendency that
defines the contemporary era," ran the revised Soviet analysis of
U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. 6
The West responded cautiously to the initiative but eventually
1. See Quigley, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J . lNT'L L. 788, 793-94
(1988).
2. M. GORBACHEV, A TIME FOR PEACE 67 (1985).
3. Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Novaia Redaktsiia,
Priniata XXVII S'ezdom KPSS [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:
New Edition, adopted by the XXVII Congress of the CPSU], Pravda, Mar. 7, 1986, at 3, 7
(deleting phrase "class struggle" from definition of peaceful coexistence); M. GORBACHEV,
PERESTROIKA I NovoE MYSHLENIE DLIA NASHEI STRANY I DLIA VSEGO MIRA [Re-Structuring
and the New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World] 150 (1987); Vereshchetin
& Miullerson, Novoe Myshlenie i Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo [The New Thinking and International Law], 1988(3) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 3, 5 (class struggle no longer
a feature of peaceful coexistence).
4. On the prior view, see McWhinney, Changing International Law Method and Objectives in the Era of the Soviet- Western Detente, 59 AM. J . lNT'L L. 1, 2-4 (1965); Quigley,
The New Soviet Approach to International Law, 7 HARV. lNT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1965).
5. E. Shevardnadze, Academic Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U .S.S.R.,

paraphrased in XIX Vsesoiuznaia Konferentsiia KPSS: Vneshniaia Politika i Diplomatiia
[The 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU: Foreign Policy and Diplomacy], Izvestiia,
July 27, 1988, at 4, col. 1.
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put forward counter-proposals aimed at reducing tension.
"[C]apitalism and communism now sit on the same side of the table facing the common threat of nuclear war," said economist John
Kenneth Galbraith. 6
Galbraith suggested that weak economic performance by both
the U.S.S.R. and United States made them less formidable to each
other. "Neither American capitalism nor Soviet socialism," he said,
"any longer projects the image of success that once induced fear in
the other country."7 The economic power of North America and
Western Europe was eroding. On the list of states with highest per
capita income, Arab states occupied several positions. Japan overtook the U .S.S.R. as the second largest economy and surpassed the
United States in many areas of production. "For each speech in
the American Congress on the socialist threat of ,the Soviet
Union," Galbraith said, "there are now at least ten on the economic threat of Japan." 8
Changes in economic style in the two states may also have
contributed to the change. By the 1980s, the differences in the capitalist and socialist systems that had earlier seemed so great no
longer posed an insurmountable obstacle to peaceful relations. In a
process of mutual emulation, capitalist states had introduced governmental regulation of the private economy, while socialist states
introduced market elements and curtailed state power over society.
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out that Japan
and West Germany became economic powers after World War II
not by building up their military establishments but by avoiding
military spending. 9 In the Soviet view, the U.S.S.R. needed to develop economically without the burden of heavy military expenditure.10 Thus, it needed to reduce its military establishment and to
avoid war. 11 The U.S.S.R. made radical proposals for arms control
calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year
2000. It made substantial unilateral reductions in troop strength in
6. Galbraith, The Dynamics of Change, HARV. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 17, 19.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id.

9. Gorbachev, Oktiabr' i Perestroika: Revoliutsiia Pro,dolzhaetsia [October and ReStructuring: The Revolution Continues], lzvestiia, Nov. 3, 1987, at 2, col. 1, 4, col. 4 (report
to joint session of central committee of CPSU, Supreme Soviet of U.S.S.R., Supreme Soviet
of RSFSR, 70th Anniversary of October Revolution).
10. See Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone & Kissinger, East-West Relations, 68 FOREIGN
AFF. 1, 3 (1989).
11. M. GORBACHEV, supra note S. at 5.
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Eastern Europe. 12 NATO responded with proposals for significant
reductions. 13 Arms control agreements permitted highly invasive
on-site inspection.
The military blocs-NATO and the Warsaw Pact-that dominated the world's security scene in the 1960s were by the 1980s less
formidable and less adversarial. China no longer sided with the
U.S.S.R. Differences among the member states of the two blocs
made them seem less threatening, as united action by them in a
crisis could not be assured. Differences of view surfaced between
member states of the Warsaw Pact. They criticized each other on
human rights issues. They took differing paths of economic reform.
In NATO, the United States insisted on a larger military establishment, while the European members held back. Germany emerged
as a strong voice for disarmament, pressuring other NATO states
to go far in the direction of the reductions called for by the
U.S.S.R. The planned elimination of trade barriers within the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1992 threatened a further
separation of the European NATO states from the United States,
particularly as the EEC came to act as a unit not only in economic
matters, but on political issues as well.
Military intervention in other states declined. The U.S.S.R.
abandoned its traditional doctrine of wars of national liberation.
This shift took the superpower element, to some degree, out of existing regional conflicts and might mean that other potential regional conflicts will not develop into military hostilities. In the late
1980s, the United States and the U.S.S.R. reduced the level of contention between them in a number of long-standing conflicts-in
Afghanistan, Western Sahara, Cambodia and Angola. The United
States has justified its own military intervention in Third World
states as a counter to the U.S.S.R. If the U .S.S.R. is not widely
perceived as involved in such activity, the United States will not
be able to use its traditional justification. Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Henry Kissinger said that the
new Soviet diplomacy on arms control and regional conflicts represented "a new concept of security." 14
12. Keller, Gorbachev Pledges Major Troop Cutback, Then Ends Trip, Citing Vast
Soviet Quake, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8. 1988, at Al, col. 6; Gorbachev's U.N. Surprise: Soviet
Arms Cuts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at A18, col. 1.
13. N.A.T.O., A Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, May 30,
1989, in U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, THE NATO SUMMIT: 40 YEARS OF SuccEss (Selected Documents No. 37).
14. Giscard d'Estaing, Nakasone & Kissinger, supra note 10, at 3.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol16/iss1/2

4

Quigley: Law for a World Community

Law for a World Community

1989]

5

The differences in domestic politics that had separated the
two states has diminished as well, with the reforms initiated by the
U.S.S.R. in the 1980s. A movement towards parliamentary rule
with multiple political parties held the promise of eliminating a
difference that had been used by the NATO states as a reason to
fear an attack from the Warsaw Pact states. The U.S.S.R. undertook a major reform of its legal system under the rubric "a socialist
state under the rule of law," which aimed to strengthen the role of
the courts and to make the government more accountable to the
citizenry. 16
II.

NEW INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS

Gorbachev has addressed a range of survival issues. The world,
he said, had become increasingly interdependent through the "internationalization of economic connections" and the technological
revolution. Greater international cooperation is needed to solve
critical world problems, like, "ecological danger," the "crying social
problems of the developing world," the nuclear arms race, and the
increasing scarcity of resources. 16 He said that an end to the arms
race and East-West rapprochement opened the door to the possibility of dealing effectively with global survival. Foreign Minister
Edward Shevardnadze said that "the struggle of two opposing systems is no longer the tendency that defines the contemporary era.
At the contemporary stage what is important is the ability to increase material benefits as quickly as possible on the basis of advanced sciences and to distribute them justly, and to restore and
protect the resources necessary for the survival of mankind.m 7
Collaboration came to be viewed as "the most important component" of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and socialist
states. 18 The two types of states should "interact closely" in "scientific-technical, economic, and social spheres, in human relations,
and in solving global problems." 19 They should pursue "common
15. Quigley, Law Reform and the Soviet Courts, 27 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. - (1989);
Quigley, The Soviet Union as a State Under the Rule of Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (1990).

16. Gorbachev, supra note 9, at 2, col. 1. See also F. BERNTHAL, RECOGNIZING THE
GLOBAL NATURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (U.S. Dep't of State, Current Policy No. 1198
(1989)).

17. E. Shevardnadze, supra note 5, at 4, col. 1.
18. Vereshchetin & Miullerson, supra note 3, at 5; see also Mullerson [Miullerson],
Sources of International Law: New Tendencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 494,
495 (1989).
19. V.A. Medvedev, Member, Politburo, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, para-
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human values. " 20
Food security came to be a problem that posed as much difficulty as military security. Malnutrition was estimated to affect
thirty percent of the world's population in the 1980s. 21 The world
population in the late twentieth century was expanding at a rate
that yielded a doubling in only thirty-five years. 22 The highest
rates of population growth were in states where chronic hunger affected large segments of the population. 23 As the world's population rose, the task of feeding its population became more difficult.H Large segments of the world's population became
chronically underfed. Soil erosion threatened to make it impossible
to provide enough food.
Economic integration may be more conducive to peace because
of the interdependency it creates. States that rely on each other for
basic products may not want to risk losing access to them. Further,
economic exchange may yield greater understanding that reduces
the likelihood of resort to war.
Ecological problems gave impetus to this development. A perception grew that ecological deterioration could threaten human
survival. 26 In the 1970s oil spills from large tankers caused considerable damage, and in 1989 the spill of oil from the Exxon Valdez
in Alaska caused catastrophic damage to marine and terrestrial
life. In the 1980s acid rain-sulphur emissions from industry-destroyed vast forests in central Europe and North America. 26
Carbon dioxide emissions brought a warming of the atmosphere
phrased in Velikii Oktiabr' i Sovremennyi Mir [Great October and the Contemporary
World], lzvestiia, Dec. 10, 1987, at 5, col. 6; see Remnick, New Ideologist Says West Can
Teach Soviets, Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1988, at Al, col. 2.
20. V.A. Medvedev, supra note 19, at 5, col. 6; Blishchenko, Na Puti k Sozdaniiu
Novogo Mezhdunarodnogo Pravoporiadka [On the Path Towards Creating a New International Legal Order], 1989(4) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 109, 110.
21. J . DILLOWAY, Is WORLD ORDER EVOLVING? AN ADVENTURE INTO HUMAN POTENTIAL 19
(1986).
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 39-40.
24. See Dong & Li, Food Situation Stirs Worldwide Concern, BEIJING REV. Feb. 6-12,
1989, at 18.
25. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director, U.N. Environment Program, cited in J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 19; Timoshenko, Global'naia Ekologicheskaia Bezopasnost'-Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Aspekt [Global Ecological Security-The InternationalLegal Aspect], 1989(1) Sov. Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 84.
26. Rissburger, On the Brink of an Ecological Calamity: Acid Rain, Transboundary
Air Pollution and Environmental Law in West Germany, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
325 (1985); Scott, The Canadian-American Problem of Acid Rain (U.S.-Canada Transboundary Resource Issues), 26 NAT. RES. J. 337 (1986).
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called the "greenhouse effect" that threatened to alter the world
climate and to render many areas uninhabitable. 27 Radiation emissions from nuclear power plants, like the 1986 emission from the
plant at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, threatened food supplies all
over Europe. 28 Destruction of the Amazon forests threatened the
planet's oxygen supply. 29 Depletion of the ozone layer through the
emission of chlorofluorocarbons threatened to admit more of the
sun's cancer-causing rays. 30 Lester Brown summarized "the new
sources of danger" as arising from "oil depletion, soil erosion, land
degradation, shrinking forests, deteriorating grasslands, and climate alteration. " 31 Many species of animals were endangered by
environmental spoliation, and their survival was addressed by an
increasing number of treaties.
Social and economic problems came increasingly to be perceived as global in character. Trafficking in drugs was addressed in
an international context. The inability of many Third World states
to repay debts to banks in developed states was perceived as an
international issue, not simply as a matter of private collection of a
debt. The economic gap between North and South came, at the
insistence of the South, to be viewed as an international problem.
International disasters, like famines in Africa and earthquakes in
Mexico and Armenia, were viewed as requiring immediate action
by other states. Private relief campaigns were undertaken on an
unprecedented scale.
Technological developments also brought increased danger
from the possibility of physical harm inflicted by individuals. The
threat of harm from acts by individuals or small groups came to be
viewed as a serious international problem. Formerly, an individual
could threaten only small numbers of other individuals. But in the
latter part of the twentieth century, individuals or small groups
could commandeer aircraft. Hand-held missiles gave individuals
the capability of shooting down aircraft in flight. Nuclear technology was so widespread that even small groups might assemble a
27. Nanda, Global Warming and International Environmental Law-A Preliminary
Inquiry, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375 (1989).
28. See Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
203, 206 (1987).
29. Murphy, Implements for the World Garden, 54 EKISTICS 336, 340-41 (1987) (address delivered July 1985).
30. S. KIM, THE QUEST FOR A JUST WORLD ORDER 253-54 (1984).
31. Brown, Redefining National Security, in THE GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 371, 372 (1988).
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nuclear weapon.
Increasingly sophisticated communications systems also
brought the danger of harm at the international level. Injecting a
virus into a computer system could disrupt communications systems worldwide. An individual "computer hacker" might interfere
with military communications or medical care delivery.
Wars continued to take their toll with many so-called "regional conflicts" in many areas. The Palestine-Israel conflict persisted as other regional conflicts were resolved. The threat of nuclear war remained, and concern became even greater following
investigations showing that a major nuclear attack would affect not
only the target area but substantial portions of the planet, whose
capacity to support life would be eroded in what was called a "nuclear winter. " 32
Contributing to the perception of possible harms was the role
played by the mass media. Events like the nuclear radiation leak in
the Ukraine or the Palestine-Israel conflict were instantly brought
,to the awareness of the public around the world. Public concern
put pressure on government officials to deal witQ. issues and conflicts that in earlier times might have gone unnoticed. It also led to
action by citizen groups.
III.

NEW GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR COLLABORATION

A factor that opened the door to a new form of international
collaboration was the potential exploitation of resources found in
three previously inaccessible environments-Antarctica, outer
· space and the deep seabed. Third World states urged that these
resources should be exploited by international institutions to benefit the international community as a whole, as the "common heritage of mankind," with a preferential share to the poorest states.
With respect to the deep se·abed, an international scheme was
negotiated and in 1980, the United States backed away from what
it called worldwide socialism and rejected internationalized administration of deep-sea resources. Space became a limited resource
with the development of communication satellites, which became a
primary tool for international communication. Only a limited number of good orbit trajectories (called geostationary orbits) could be
used to transmit to earth. Developing states, as with the seabed,
argued that orbiting locations constituted a "common heritage,"
32. Sagan, Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe: A Nuclear Winter, in
supra note 31, at 409-424.

THE GLOBAL
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while developed states preferred allocation to those first able to
use them. Some compromise was achieved. 33 In Antarctica, an
agreement was negotiated to limit states in their exploitation of
mineral resources. 34

IV.

SOUTH-NORTH TENSION OVER RESOURCE CONTROL

Control of resources has long been a matter of international
concern and tension. In the nineteenth century, as the industrial
revolution required inputs from abroad and a market in which to
sell mass-produced goods, European states competed with each
other for control of foreign territory. In the late twentieth century
the issue of control over resources took on a new dimension. The
specter of a growing population and substantial starvation in developing states heightened the concern of those states that resources in common areas be considered "common heritage," and
that developed states give them an opportunity to catch up with
them.
The less developed states declined economically in comparison
with the developed states. The terms of trade for their commodities steadily deteriorated through the latter twentieth century.a&
Tariffs continued to be higher on raw materials, their chief exports, than on manufactured goods. 36 The developing states put
forward a program that would require fair treatment for them on
tariffs in developed states and would impose on developed states
an obligation to assist them in the development process. In response, a number of developed states adopted a "generalized system of preferences" to give developing states lower tariffs than
they gave to developed states for like commodities. 37
The international debt crisis of the 1980s produced tension between developed and developing states, but the approach taken to
it reflected a change in the international order. Full repayment
would have brought such economic devastation to a number of
33. See Kosmo, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that Promotes
Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1988).
34. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for
signature Nov. 25. 1988, 27 l.L.M. 859 (1988); see Jacobsen, Recent Developments, International Agreements: Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities,
opened for signature Nov. 25, 1988, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J . 237 (1989); Joyner, The Evolving
Antarctic Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 73 (1988).
35. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 154-55; Head, South-North Dangers, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 71,
80 (1989).
36. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 155.
37. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466.
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states that their governments declared that they could not pay in
full. The developed states had to consider the consequences of insisting on repayment under the contractual terms to the continuing relations between developing states and the developed world. It
therefore compromised with proposals for partial debt reduction. 38
In the early twentieth century, a declaration of inability to pay by
a Third World state might have led to the appearance of gunboats
in the major port of such a state, but by the late twentieth century
the economic inter-relations between the Third World states and
the developed states made it necessary to find a solution that
would continue the relationship.
Tension developed between Brazil and other states over the
Amazon forests, as it was realized that the cutting of those forests
threatened the world's oxygen supply. Brazil argued that as a developing state it should be able to use its own resources to its best
advantage, and that it need not give primary consideration to the
effects on others. The alliances that developed on this issue reflected the new style of international process. Many other states
were allied with non-governmental environmental organizations,
and with those Brazilians who made a livelihood by tapping the
Amazon trees to make rubber. All were arrayed against the Brazilian government and Brazilian developers.
The U.S.S.R. for the most part supported the newly independent states in their quest for what they viewed as a more just international economic and political order. It shared with them a
concern that international law as it stood at mid-century was
Western European-derived. Like them, it was wary of international
custom as a source of law since that custom had been developed by
Western Europe, and judges in international tribunals looked to
Wes tern European practice to determine customary norms. Like
them, it promoted multilateral treaties as a more appropriate vehicle for establishing international-legal norms.
Wariness about the Western European orientation of international law also made both the Third World and the U.S.S.R. reluctant to accept compulsory international adjudication. Both the
substantive law and the personnel of international tribunals were
viewed as Western-oriented. By the 1980s, however, this view had
changed. The Third World came to command about half the seats
on the International Court of Justice. Much of the law was by then
to be found in multilateral treaties, in which the U .S.S.R. and the
38. Sachs, Making the Brady Plan Work, 68
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Third World had played a role. By the last decade of the century,
the initiative in the expansion of international law had been taken
over by the Third World and the U.S.S.R. and its allied states.

V.

THE EXPANDED OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

As a common quest for survival assumed a more central role,
the character of international law changed. International law came
to regulate relations formerly left to domestic jurisdiction. 39 International procedures increasingly invaded domestic legal processes.
International law developed to create many new sets of norms, including those relating to human rights, self-determination of peoples, liability of a state for assisting another state to violate international law, liability of a state for high-risk domestic economic
activity, mandatory rules from which states were not permitted to
derogate, criminal liability on the part of individual persons, and
criminal liability on the part of states. Taken together, these expansions gave international law a much more serious role in ordering legal relations.

A. Human Rights
The development in the twentieth century of human rights
law seriously invaded domestic jurisdiction. Nineteenth century international law had known humanitarian law, which protected individuals in wartime. It also knew "denial of justice," which protected an individual from ill treatment by a foreign government.
But the wrong was deemed a wrong against the state of which the
victim was a national, not a wrong directly against the victim. And
the international law on denial of justice did not protect an individual from her or his own government.
Human rights law began with political rights but, largely at
the urging of the Soviet Union, expanded to include social and economic rights, like employment, education, and health care:' 0 In the
latter half of the twentieth century, at the insistence of Third
World states, 41 it expanded to such matters of common concern as
39. Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the Law
of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SocIETY 357, 368 (1984); Schwarzenberger,
The Principles and Standards of International Economic Law, 117 RECUEIL DES CouRs 1
(1967).
40. See Konst. SSSR, arts. 118-123 (U.S.S.R. Constitution 1936); A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 300-03 (1986).
41. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 307.
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a right to a clean environment,"2 a right to food, 43 a right to development,"" and a right to peace (freedom from war). 46 These matters were formulated as rights of the individual, or as collective
rights of a group. There developed, for example, the notion that a
people, as a collectivity, has a right to development, and that this
included a duty for governments to promote the development of
their citizens,46 and for developed states to pursue aid and trade
policies that promote development in the Third World.4 7
Regional and universal mechanisms to enforce human rights
grew. Africa in the 1980s generated a treaty for a regional human
rights mechanism, 48 and the Western Hemisphere, which already
had one, upgraded it by establishing a human rights court. 49 In
Arab states, proposals for a regional human rights treaty were
aired. 60 A regional human rights treaty was advocated for Eastern
Europe. 1n The U.S.S.R. dropped its long-standing objection to international monitoring of human rights on its territory. 62 In 1989 it
withdrew reservations it had filed to six human rights treaties by
which it had opted out of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for disputes over interpretation. 53
42. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm
Declaration) June 5-16, 1972, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973); Timoshenko,
supra note 25, at 86.
43. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217, Dec. 10, 1948, 3
U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 442 (1981); THE RIGHT TO Fooo (P. Alston &
K. Tomasevski eds. 1985).
44. Marks, supra note 43, at 444-45.
45. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace, G.A. Res. 33/73, 33
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1979)("Every ... human being ... has
the inherent right to life in peace.") Vote: 138-0-2; Marks, supra note 43, at 445-46.
46. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, chap. 2, art. 7, G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251
(1975); J . D1LLOWAY, supra note 21, at 19.
47. Marks, supra note 43, at 444.
48. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, entered into force
Oct. 21, 1986, 21 l.L.M. 58 (1982); 7 HuM. RTs. L.J. 403 (1986).
49. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force June
1978, Organization of American States, Official Records OEA/SER.K/XVI/1.1, Document
65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, Jan. 7, 1970, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
50. Youssoufi, Human Rights in Arab Countries, INT'L CoMM'N JURISTS REV. 33 (Dec.
1987).
51. Chkhikvadze, 0 Nekotorykh Mezhdunarodnykh Aspektakh Problemy Prav
Cheloveka [On Certain International Aspects of the Issue of Human Rights] 1988(7) Sov.
Gos. & PRAVO [Soviet State and Law] 85, 92.
52. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 303; Quigley, Human Rights Study in Soviet
Academia, 11 HuM. RTs. Q. 452, 457 (1989).
53. Soviet Union Accepts Compulsory Jurisdiction of !CJ for Six Human Rights Con-
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The first and best developed regional system was that of
Western Europe, which came to provide, in effect, a supranational
appeals court for persons alleging violation of their rights in domestic courts. This system had a strong impact on states. The European Convention was accepted as domestic law in a number of
states parties, and it had a strong impact on civil rights in the domestic courts of state parties. 54 States parties typically complied
with adverse decisions, as when the United Kingdom's decision repealed the Northern Ireland sodomy statute after the European
Court of Human Rights found it to violate the European Convention's right of privacy. 66 In the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, the European states agreed to a highly invasive procedure
whereby an international panel had the right to visit prisons located in their territory to verify allegations of physical abuse of
detainees. 56
The law regulating the conduct of warfare and post-war military occupation also underwent significant change. It evolved from
a law between states to a law in which individuals directly bore
rights. The nineteenth century law on this topic, called humanitarian law, was based on treaty or customary-law duties between and
among the belligerent powers. They agreed among themselves to
refrain from torturing prisoners and to treat civilians humanely in
territory they occupied. But in the late twentieth century, human
rights law invaded this domain. Increasingly, states viewed those
caught up in war as bearing rights under human rights law. Thus,
if a belligerent power in occupation of foreign territory violated the
rights of individuals, it might be accused of violating human rights
norms. 57
Human rights law challenged the traditional structure of inventions, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 457 (1989) (Letter of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs to U.N.
Secretary-General, Feb. 28, 1989).
54. Danish Center of Human Rights, The Implementation in National Law of the European Convention on Human Rights: Proceedings of the Fourth Copenhagen Conference
on Human Rights, 28 and 29 October 1988 (1989).
55. Dudgeon Case, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
56. European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Nov. 26, 1987, Council of Europe Doc. H
(87) 4, reprinted in 27 l.L.M. 1152 (1988); See Cassese, A New Approach to Human Rights:
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, 83 AM. J. INT 1L L. 128, 139-45
(1989).
57. See Quigley, The Relation Between Human Rights Law and the Law of Belligerent
Occupation: Does an Occupied Population Have a Right to Freedom of Assembly and Expression?, 12 BOSTON C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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ternational law in three ways. First, it gave rights to individuals. It
posited that the individual, regardless of any affiliation with a
state, has rights that may not be violated by any state. Second,
human rights law invaded domestic jurisdiction in a serious way. It
opened a vast area of state conduct to international scrutiny. This
aspect of human rights law led to opposition to it. In the United
States, in particular, the Senate opposed adhering to human rights
treaties, out of concern that such issues as race relations would become the subject of international investigation. Whether a state
gives equal treatment to all its citizens, whether it incarcerates arbitrarily, whether it gives a right to counsel in criminal cases-all
these became matters of international concern. In 1989 the European Court of Human Rights found the conditions under which
prisoners condemned to death are held to be subject to international scrutiny. It said that if the United Kingdom were to extradite to Virginia a person accused of a capital offense, the person
would be subjected to "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" under Article 3 of the European Convention, since it found
those conditions deficient. 68
Third, human rights law involved obligations from one state to
another. A state obligation not to violate the rights of the individual was considered to run not only to the individual but to other
states. Thus, if a state violated the rights of a given individual it
thereby violated an obligation to all other states. This concept was
expressed by the International Court of Justice when it said that
human rights norms are norms erga omnes, meaning that each
state is obliged before every other state to observe human rights. 69
As formulated in 1949, this same erga omnes concept adhered
in humanitarian law. The four 1949 Geneva conventions regulating
the conduct of belligerent states all included an identical Article 1
that required states not only to observe the convention but to ensure respect for it by the other signatory states. 60 Thus, states un58. Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (ser. A) (1989); Quigley & Shank, Death Row as a
Violation of Human Rights: ls It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J . INT'L L. (1990).
59. Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 l.C.J. 32; Brownlie, To What Extent Are
the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still Viable?, in CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 66, 71 (1988) [hereinafter CHANGE AND STABILITY].
60. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No.
3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treat-
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dertook an obligation to encourage other states to observe the conventions. This idea went beyond the traditional view that only in
the event of breach were another signatory state's rights affected.
The common Article 1 imposed on signatory states, even prior to a
breach by another, an obligation to encourage compliance. Thus,
each signatory state was responsible for any individual anywhere
who might need the convention's protection. This idea was reflective of a world community approach, as opposed to a notion of a
treaty as simply a contract between two states.
B.

Self-Determination of Peoples

The right to self-determination developed at the same period
as human rights law. 61 It too took international law beyond the
realm of interstate relationships. It posited that certain groupings
of individuals, based on their culture and history, have international standing, and a right to determine their own political status.
The law of self-determination also included the requirement that a
state administering the territory of another people must do so in
the interests of that people, not for its own gain. 62 Self-determination was viewed as a prerequisite for peace, since peoples forcibly
deprived of freedom could be expected to fight to attain it. In this
way it took a more sophisticated approach to preserving the peace,
since it looked not to the outbreak of hostilities but to an underlying cause of hostilities.
Support for self-determination was strengthened by the entrance of former colonies onto the international stage as new
states. Their own history of being denied self-determination oriented them to championing self-determination in international
law. 63 International institutions took up self-determination situament of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.l.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.l.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
61. Quigley, Palestine's Declaration of Independence and the Right of the Palestinians
to Statehood, 7 BosTON U. INT'L L.J. 1, 2-12 (1989).
62. Quigley, The Legality of Military Bases in Non-Self-Governing Territory: The
Case of United States Bases in Puerto Rico, 16 DENVER J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 323, 324-26
(1988).
63. One exception relates to self-determination of peoples within the borders of those
newly independent states. The fact that colonial boundaries had been drawn in disregard of
the territories occupied by national groupings meant that the boundaries, particularly of
Africa, were arbitrary. The African states feared that if those boundaries were qu~stioned,
anarchy would prevail on the continent. The new states also, of course, had a self-interest in
maintaining control over the territory they inherited from the colonial powers.
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tions, like those involving the people of Namibia, Western Sahara,
Palestine, or Puerto Rico. States began to pressure those states
that denied self-determination, as in the Security Council-sponsored commercial boycott of Southern Rhodesia following the establishment there of a racial minority government, 6 • and its arms
embargo against South Africa. 65 Individual states began to pressure states that violated the right of self-determination by refusing
or limiting commercial relations. 66
The law of self-determination acquired renewed significance in
the 1980s when many ethnic groups within constituted states
pressed longstanding claims to independence or greater autonomy.
The Kurds in various Middle Eastern states, the Sikhs in India,
Native Americans in the United States, Hungarians in Romania,
Turks in Bulgaria, Croats in Yugoslavia, and the republic populations of the U.S.S.R. all claimed group rights. This pressure kept
self-determination a significant issue even as colonialism of the
nineteenth century variety gradually ended.
C.

A Prohibition Against Facilitating Wrongs by Other States

Another new norm that expanded the reach of international law
was complicity. In the latter half of the twentieth century a norm
emerged to prohibit material aid to another state that uses the aid
to violate internationally protected rights. 67 It developed in response to changes in the international order. The superpower
states had acquired the potential to involve other states in their
own violations of international law. They used the territory of
other states to station their troops, giving rise to the question of
the responsibility of the host state if the guest troops committed
aggression against some third state. In addition, the superpower
states possessed the resources to provide other states with the
means to accomplish tasks that they themselves either could not or
did not want to undertake directly. Finally, by giving material aid
to other states, they made it possible for those states to undertake
operations it might not otherwise have been able to undertake, and
64. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dees. 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/Rev.1 (1968).
65. S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR, Res. & Dees. 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1978).
66. Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1986).
67. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 27 in Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 187-96, U.N. Doc.
A/33/10 (1978), reprinted in [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 78-80, U.N.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1978/Add.1 (pt. 2); Quigley, Complicity in International Law: A New Direction in the Law
of State Responsibility, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 77, 95-104.
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those operations might involve violations of internationally protected rights. A superpower state might, for example, give weaponry or ammunition that the recipient state would use in committing aggression. Some states cut off aid to states that committed
serious human rights violations rights. They stopped sales of chemicals upon discovering that they were being used to manufacture
chemical weapons. 68
The recognition of the illegality of providing aid that would be
used unlawfully represented a substantial refinement of the law of
state responsibility. It mirrored a similar development in the domestic criminal law of homicide, where historically the first act
prohibited was infliction of death. At that stage of society, criminal
law aimed at reconciling two parties and preventing private vengeance. Only later, when criminal law undertook to protect the entire community did there arise a criminal prohibition against ancillary forms of conduct, like complicity, attempt, or conspiracy. 69
These forms of liability reflected a concept of a community with
interests to protect, the offender having manifested a dangerousness that might result in future criminal acts.
Similarly, the emergence in international law of a norm that
prohibited states from materially aiding a wrongful act by another
state reflected a concept of community interests. A state providing .
aid was responsible for harm that might be caused by another
state, even though it, as the donor, had not been directly involved
in bringing about that harm.
A prohibition against helping other states to violate international.:legal norms was not confined to material aid. In Soering, the
United Kingdom extradition case cited above, the European Court
of Human Rights imposed on the United Kingdom an obligation
not to extradite a person to Virginia. It said that Virginia would
violate the person's rights. Yet it said that the United Kingdom
would violate the European Convention by, in effect, giving Virginia the opportunity to violate the person's rights. The United
Kingdom would itself violate international law by facilitating a violation by Virginia. 70
D.

Responsibility for High Risk Activity

State responsibility also expanded in ·response to ecological
68. Quigley, supra note 67, at 83-95.
69. T. PLUCKNETI, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 452-54 (5th ed. 1956).
70. See Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 35 (ser. A) (1989).
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dangers. As pollution became a more serious problem, states were
held responsible to prevent the emission from their territory of
pollutants that harm the environments of other states. 71 The International Law Commission undertook to draft a treaty on harm
from what it called "acts not prohibited by international law,"
which included liability for transboundary pollution and other
harms resulting from high risk activity. 72 A number of multilateral
treaties provided liability for harms from such activity as maritime
pollution, the falling of space satellites, and the operation of nuclear power plants. 73 An older rule that, in their use of international rivers, states are not responsible to lower riparian states for
diversion or pollution gave way to a rule of fair use, much like that
found in domestic law. 74 A convention was also negotiated to curtail the depletion of the ozone layer. 75
This new liability significantly expanded the scope of the responsibility of one state to another. It meant that liability existed
not only for an act specifically directed to another state but for
whatever activity might occur within a state-undertaken by the
government or by private parties-that caused harm within another state. All industrial activity was thus opened to international
scrutiny. Even private persons and corporations could subject their
states to international liability from their high risk industrial
activity.
E.

Jus Cogens Norms

The law of state responsibility also developed the idea of jus
71. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL
DES CouRs 99 (1967); Schneider, State Responsibility for Environmental Protection and
Preservation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 602, 603 (1985); Trail
Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
72. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law,
(1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 247 (part 1), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/334 and Add. 1 and 2 (1980).
73. See Quentin-Baxter, supra note 72, at 255 n.47 (treaties listed).
74. Id. at 257.
75. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature
Mar. 22, 1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/lG.53/5/Rev.l, reprinted in 26 l.L.M. 1529 (1987); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16.
1987, reprinted in 26 l.L.M .. 1550 (1987); Lammers, Efforts to Develop a Protocol on
Chlorofiuorocarbons to the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Lay er, 1
HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 225 (1988); Whitney, Talks on Ozone End in Britain Without Fixing
Chemical Ban, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8. 1989, at A8, col. 1; Sorensen, International Agreements-Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Lay er, 29 HARV. INT'L
L.J . 185 (1988).
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cogens, or mandatory norms. The nineteenth century notion was
that because international law is between and among states, the
states may alter its norms at will. But the jus cogens idea was that
there are certain norms of such transcending importance that
states may not avoid them unilateraliy or by agreement with another state. 76 Jus cog ens challenged the positivist view that states
have the final word in establishing international law norms. 77
Jus cogens reflected a concept of an international community.
Like a domestic legal order, the international legal order has certain fundamental principles that may not be violated. With jus
cogens, international law norms came to protect community interests. They reflected the existence of an international ordre
public. 78
F.

Individual Criminal Responsibility

The individual has for several centuries borne criminal responsibility in international law. The first such crime was piracy, on the
theory that the offense was against all humankind. A pirate was
called hostis humanis generis. The crime of piracy implied a certain concept of a world community, since piracy was deemed to
violate the world social order. Later, slave trading became a crime
of individual responsibility, on the same theory.
Individual criminal responsibility became more significant in
the mid-twentieth century with the war crimes trials held after
World War II, particularly at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Here too the
concept was that the crimes affected the world social order. One
formulation of crime was for widespread killing, which was denominated "crime against humanity." The concept of war crimes was
used extensively in the four 1949 Geneva humanitarian conventions.79 Individual criminal responsibility reflected a concept of a
76. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 53, 64. entered into force Jan. 27,
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969); Brownlie, To What
Extent Are the Traditional Categories of Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda Still Viable?, in
CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 66, 71.
77. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J . INT'L L. 359, 361 (1988).
78. Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J . INT'L L. 946, 949 (1967).
79. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, supra note 60, arts. 49-50; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea,
supra note 60, arts. 50-51; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 60, arts. 129-130; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 60, arts. 146-147.
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world community as well by making the individual directly responsible before the international community. The individual's responsibility ran not only to states whose laws she or he might violate,
but also to an international body politic.

G. State Criminal Responsibility
The existence of a world community was also assumed by an
idea that emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century that a
state may be guilty of a crime. Certain breaches of international
law were deemed more serious than others and merited being considered offenses not simply against the party harmed, but against
the world community. The concept of state crime opened the path
to international action to curb the illegal acts of states. Its first
major manifestation was in Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, which provided for collective action in the event of aggression
by a state.
The state crime idea was expanded beyond aggression by the
International Law Commission in its draft articles on state responsibility.80 As elaborated by the Commission, major violations of
human rights, forcible maintenance of colonialism or other forcible
denial of the right to self-determination, and massive pollution of
the environment are unlawful state actions against which the international community has a right to respond. 81 The International
Law Commission's rationale was that these acts harm not only the
individual victims but the world order as a whole. 82
Historically, the emergence of a distinction between acts affecting other rights-bearers only and acts affecting the international community as a whole paralleled the development in domestic law from regulation of disputes between clans to protection by
the body politic of each individual-the development from tort to
crime. 83 Harm to the individual was first handled by a law giving
80. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, art. 19, in Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 59, 64. U.N. Doc.
A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in (1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1980/Add. 1 (part 2).
81. Id.
82. Quigley, The International Law Commission 's Crime-Delict Distinction: A Toothless Tiger?, 66 REVUE DE DROIT INT'L 117, 119 (1988). For opposition to the concept of international crime on the ground that there is not a genuine international community, see Wise,
International Crimes and Domestic International Law, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 923, 931 (1989).
83. Gounelle, Quelques Remarques sur la Notion de Crime International et sur
l'Evolution de la Responsabilite Internationale de l'Etat, in MELANGES 0FFERTS 'A PAUL
REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: UNITE ET DIVERSITE 315, 318 (1981).
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the victim's clan redress against the perpetrator's clan and later
developed into a law that posited that one who caused harm to an
individual had violated an obligation of fealty to the sovereign.
This development resulted in England in the emergence of the
concept of felony, which meant a breach of the obligation of an
individual to the sovereign. H
As in domestic law, the development from tort to crime reflected a reform in the political order. In domestic law, the change
from law as a regulator of inter-clan conflict to law as a regulator
of relations between a sovereign and an individual paralleled the
strengthening of the power of the state. The sovereign had claims
against each individual. In international law, the introduction of
state crime reflected a change from law as a regulator of interstate
conflict to law as a regulator of relations in an international
community.

VI. A

NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STYLE

Apart from the development of new norms, international law
experienced a marked change in the process by which norms were
created. Norm-creation became faster and simpler. As states dealt
with each other on an ever widening range of issues, norms came to
be established by multilateral treaty on many matters. The process
of formation of norms of customary law was radically altered by
the increasing interaction of states. Formerly, a period of time was
necessary for the formation of a customary norm. But as states interacted more frequently, norms formed rapidly. 85 Joint statements at international conferences came to be regarded as evidence of state practice. 86 Provisions of multilateral treaties came to
be seen as reflecting customary law. 87
A new notion developed in international norm-creation that
went under the name "soft law." Certain nascent norms were seen
as being in a kind of gestation period, having some support in state
84. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 69, at 442.
85. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CusTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-60 (1971); Cassese,
General Round-Up, in CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 166; North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42.
86. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 1.C.J. 25.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102
(1987); Sohn, The Law of the Sea: Customary International Law Developments, 34 AM.
U.L. REV. 271-78 (1985); Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV.
1073, 1076 (1986); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 41; A. D'AMATO, supra note 85, at 164-66; D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 CoLUM. L. REV. 1110, 1146 (1982).

Published by SURFACE, 1989

21

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1989], Art. 2

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

22

[Vol. 16:1

practice but not yet accepted as law.ss The concept of "soft law"
gave some standing to concepts not fully accepted as norms. The
designation ·speeded acceptance of the concept as a full norm.

VII.

THE NEW LAW AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

While the general tendency of the new norm-creation was to
subject more areas of conduct within a state to international regulation, there was a reverse tendency as well.s 9 The Third World
states pressed for non-interference in their affairs by the stronger
states, thereby emphasizing their sovereignty. The Western hemisphere states wrote into the O.A.S. Charter a strong provision
against military intervention. 90 They were wary not only of troop
intervention, but of economic intervention that might bring
outside domination of their labor and material resources. 91 Third
World states pressed for recognition of claims to broad stretches of
coastal water as being under national jurisdiction, to protect them
from use by the developed states, particularly for fishing. The outlawing of cross-border pollution also involved a strengthening of
the sovereignty of the victim states. Thus, while the newly emerging law infringed the sovereignty of states, it often did so by
strengthening the sovereignty of the states ·who were potential victims of the conduct in question.
The most significant tendency, still, was in the direction of eroding state sovereignty. The erosion came about in response to
conditions that required states to act collectively, and this same
necessity is likely to lead to a further substantial erosion of sovereignty. "[S]tates will be forced to agree voluntarily to a limitation
on sovereignty that would allow for solutions to many problems of
domestic development," said a leading Soviet international
lawyer. 92
This encroachment on sovereignty elicited some objection.
Certain developed states., seeing the dynamism in norm creation
being taken over by the developing states, argued in the 1980s that
customary law was forming too easily. The United States, for example, argued, not without basis, that a customary norm could not
88. CHANGE AND STABILITY, supra note 59, at 89-90 (statement of Georges Abi-Saab).
89. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1984).
90. Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948,
arts. 15-18, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419-20, T.l.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 57-8 (1948).
91. S. KIM, supra note 30, at 53-54.
92. Blishchenko, supra note 20, at 111.
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bind a state that "persistently objected" to its formation. 93 This
represented a turnabout from an earlier period when it was the
developing states and the U.S.S.R. that insisted on the consent of
states as a basis for norm creation94 because they did not view
themselves as having a role in creating customary norms.
There was also concern that international law was restricting
too significantly the unilateral action a state might find appropriate to meet a perceived threat. The United States during the
1980s, in justifying various military actions, advanced arguments
that sought to expand the bases for justification of the use of
force. 96
While the encroachment on sovereignty was substantial, it
represented merely an acceleration of a process of long standing,
not a new process. Sovereignty had always been ceded when states
perceived a need for international action. After World War I the
right of states to go to war gave way to a prohibition against aggressive force. Sovereignty was infringed in the aim of preventing
another major war. Even as "domestic" an issue as employer-employee relations gave way in the early twentieth century to a limited degree of international regulation. The Bolshevik Revolution
in Russia in 1917 presented the possibility of the overthrow of governments by groups espousing worker rights. The major powers
viewed worker rebellion as a threat to themselves. 96 So in 1919
they established the International Labor Organization and in its
constitution identified discontent among workers as a threat to
world peace:
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice,
hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce
unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are
imperilled. 97

The preamble drew the conclusion that "improvement of those
conditions is urgently required" and listed as areas of reform:
hours of work, prevention of unemployment, wage levels, work-related disease and injury, protection of children, and freedom of
93. See Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary
International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1985).
94. Quigley, supra note 4, at 15.
95. Quigley, The Reagan Administration's Legacy to International Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 199, 200-04 (1988).
96. A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 10 (1971).
97. Constitution of the International Labor Organization, Oct. 9. 1946, Preamble, 15
U.N.T.S. 35 (amended text, but no change in this language from 1919 version).
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worker association. 98
Sovereignty was eroded in another way as well in the latter
half of the twentieth century. International law came increasingly
to be applied domestically. Historically, the division between domestic law and international law was sharp. International law, as a
law between states was handled in foreign offices and through international negotiation. It had only limited impact on the law applied in domestic courts. Increasingly, however, international law
impacted on the law applied in domestic courts.
This phenomenon was most dramatic in Europe, where domestic law was displaced by European Community law through
public administration at the community level, and through a community court with power to enforce community law against conflicting domestic law. 99 As indicated above, Europe's human rights
procedures also impacted significantly on domestic courts in
Europe. 100
Elsewhere, the rate of increase of international law was less
dramatic. But the steady growth of international interaction
brought an increasing number of internationally-related disputes
into domestic courts. As states became more involved in commercial activity in the twentieth century, courts abandoned their former notion that states enjoy absolute immunity from court jurisdiction in other states and adjudicated claims against them. 101
Domestic courts began to apply human rights law. 102 With the increase in international air travel, domestic courts routinely applied
the international rules on the liability of air carriers embodied in
the Warsaw Convention. 103
VIII.

THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

While international law in the nineteenth century was a law
for states, this concept was substantially eroded in the latter half
of the ·twentieth century. Individual persons, groups, and corporations began to play an international role and started to become the
98. Id.
99. D. WYA'IT & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 53-55 (1980).
100. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, 1950 l.L.R. 155 (Austria Supreme
Court 1950).
102. Filartiga v. Pefta-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F.
Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd. on other grounds, 754 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
103. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 49 U.S.C.A. App. § 1502 (1976). See, e.g.,
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
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bearers of rights and obligations under international law.
A.

Citizen Groups

Individuals and groups began to lobby states on their positions
on international law issues. The negotiations leading to the 1982
Law of the Sea Treaty, for example, involved considerable lobbying by citizen groups seeking equitable distribution of deep seabed
resources and strong environmental protection. The United Nations has encouraged these efforts by giving citizen groups access
to the United. Nations. It thus allows these groups, which it
designates non-governmental organizations, to make their views
known to relevant United Nations bodies.
This development was facilitated by the increasing ease of international communication and transportation, which allowed likeminded individuals worldwide to be in touch with each other. 104
Persons with common interests united on issues of common concern.106 Workers supported the demands of workers in other states
for improved wages or work conditions, and writers supported the
demands of writers in other states for greater freedom of
expression. 106
Citizen groups, often worldwide in membership, came to constitute an influential constituency in the international legal
arena. 107 Many citizen groups had a serious impact on the policies
of governments. In West Germany, citizen groups opposed to nuclear weaponry were instrumental in the West German government's decision to urge other NATO states to reduce the levels of
their weaponry. Non-governmental human rights monitoring organizations generated considerable pressure on states by publicizing
rights violations. The Greenpeace organization blocked ships fishing for endangered species and disrupted nuclear weapons testing.
With the emergence of human rights law and individual criminal responsibility, individuals increasingly viewed themselves as direct participants in the international system, apart from their affiliation with a state. They invoked international law in domestic
104. The level of transactions between persons of different states is said to double every
ten years. Inkeles, The Emerging Social Structure of the World, 27 WORLD PoL. 467, 479
(1975).
105. See A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 414-17.
106. Dore, University and Diversity in World Culture, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 407, 418.
107. Galtung, Self-Reliance: An Overriding Strategy for Transition, in 1 TOWARD A
JusT WORLD ORDER 602, 616-17 (1982); A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 410.
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courts. Persons charged with criminal offenses for acts that challenged their governments, appealed to international law as a legal
basis for their actions. They asserted a violation of international
law by the state as justification for their own action or said that
their state's action was unlawful and that as a citizen they would
be responsible for an international crime by permitting the action
to continue. 108
The increasing role of individuals and groups added a new element of strength to international law. If there is to be a world community, it must enjoy the support of the subjects of that community. Just as domestic governmental processes remain
representative only if the citizenry is interested and vigilant, so international processes can serve the welfare of the world community
only if the world community insists that these ends be served. It
was said of the League of Nations that one reason it was unable to
keep the peace was that there had not developed "a public opinion
in the service of peace," and that nationalistic feeling prevailed
over a demand that states not go to war. 109 But in the latter half of
the twentieth century, substantial support developed for international procedures directed at promoting the survival needs of the
world community.

B.

Business Corporations

Multinational corporations-another type of non-state actor-also came to exert pressure on governments, lobbying states
on international legal issues. The strong negative reaction of the
United States to the "common heritage of mankind" principle in
the General Assembly's Moon Treaty resulted primarily from pressure of mining corporations concerned that the Treaty's "common
heritage" principle regarding the Moon's mineral resources would
hamper their projected exploration and mining of the Moon. 110
Pressure from these companies also influenced the United States
to back away from the "common heritage of mankind" principle in
the Law of the Sea Treaty. 111
108. See F. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESISTANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-10
(1987).
109. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 55-56 (P. Corbett trans. 1957); see also E. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS CRISIS (1919-1939) at 37-38 (1962).
110. Richardson, In Pursuit of a Law of the Sea, Wash. Post, Mar. 24, 1980, at A22,
col. 3.
111. Deep Seabed Mining, Hearings on H.R. 3350 and H.R . 4582: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Oceanography, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 135, 191, 205, 228, 311 , 345 (state-
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Corporations to date have had only a marginal role in international organizations. It has been suggested that they should have a
role in international law-making. 112 However, with the exception of
the International Labor Organization, which provides for direct
participation by labor and business, corporations have not been
given a significant role in law-making or other activities of international organizations. 113
Nonetheless, corporations are significant international actors,
some commanding resources that dwarf those of many states. Like
individuals and citizen groups, they have come to form an important element of the world community.
IX.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONA.L INSTITUTIONS

International institutions have also become important actors
in international affairs. While international institutions are created
by states, they often develop a life of their own and play an independent role. In the late twentieth century, international institutions came to occupy an important position in international life. 114
Many were at the regional level, reflecting a search for solutions to
problems in concert with neighboring states. 115 In the 1980s the
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States were added to the existing regional organizations. The
EEC gradually replaced the individual European states as economic and political actors. With its 1992 changes, the EEC reflected a high level of economic, political, and legal integration,
permitting supranational decisions binding on member states on a
broad range of issues. 116 A number of regional economic organizations were established to coordinate economic policy. Regional organizations became a significant factor in the international legal
order.
International institutions of universal scope came to manage
an increasing range of international work in the latter half of the
twentieth century. Many were associated with the United Nations,
and much of their activity related to economic development. The
ments of corporate representatives).
112. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public International Law,
1983 DUKE L.J . 748, 754-56.
113. Id. at 750-51.
114. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (1964).
115. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 411.
116. Meessen, Europe en Route to 1991: The Completion of the Internal Market and
Its Impact on Non-Europeans, 23 lNT'L LAW. 359 (1989).
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United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, for example,
along with several score of other inter-governmental organizations,
worked to improve food supplies. 117
Cold war differences between the major powers put serious
limitations on the role of international institutions. Those differences kept the Security Council from playing the role projected for
it in the United Nations Charter. In the 1980s Soviet President
Gorbachev called for greater use of international institutions in
solving regional conflicts and in resolving the problems of poverty
and ecological spoliation. 118 Gorbachev called for greater use by
states of the International Court of Justice to resolve disputes, and
moved sharply from the U.S.S.R.'s traditional wariness of beforethe-fact submission of disputes to compulsory international
adjudication. 119
The Soviet overture to the United Nations and International
Court of Justice was significant because of the U.S.S.R.'s traditional caution on ceding powers to international bodies. A Soviet
international lawyer saw a need for "voluntary recognition of a certain degree of supranationality for international mechanisms and
of the absolute binding character of their decisions. " 120 The
U.S.S.R. agreed to make long-avoided payments to finance United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
The Soviet initiatives at the United Nations opened the possibility that the organization might be able to achieve the goals set
out in its Charter in 1945. In the late 1980s, in fact, the United
Nations brokered the end to a number of long-standing military
conflicts, notably those in Afghanistan, Western Sahara, Namibia
and Iran-Iraq.
After World War I, and again after World War II, the initiative for international institutions came from the major powers. Determined to protect the world from the scourge of war, they established international mechanisms. By the 1960s, the initiative came
from the newly independent states, who pressed for a world order
premised on the view that the resources should be distributed
117. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS, THE UNITED STATES, FAO
AND WORLD FOOD POLITICS' U.S. RELATIONS WITH AN INTERNATIONAL FOOD ORGANIZATION,
STAFF REPORT, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1976); Puchala & Hopkins, Toward Innovation in
the Global Food Regime, 32 INT'L 0RG'N 855 (1978).
118. Aide-memoire, Sept. 22, 1988, U.N. Doc. A/43/629, Annex (1988).
119. Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the
United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 539 (1989).
120. Blishchenko, supra note 20, at 111.
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more equitably. 121 International institutions increasingly served
the ends of economic development.

X.

LAW FOR A WORLD COMMUNITY

The nineteenth century view that international law was a law
for states was eroded by the many changes in the substance of international law and in the process by which it is created, as well as
by the appearance of non-state actors and international institutions. These changes tended in the direction of creating a law for
what was increasingly viewed as a world community with interests
of its own. "The one world in which the law now operates is a
world which, despite constant setbacks, is in process of organizing
itself as a world community," wrote C. Wilfred Jenks in 1969. 122
Wolfgang Friedmann in 1964 said that a "co-operative law"
was emerging. "Unlike the traditional law of nations," he wrote,
which is predicated on the assumption of conflicts of national interests, cooperative international law requires a community of interests. The challenge posed by the changes in the structure of contemporary international society does not eliminate the pivotal
importance of self-interest in international relations; it does, however, radically affect the dimensions and objectives of self-interest.
The emerging international organizations are tentative expressions
of new world-wide interests in security, survival and co-operation
for the preservation and development of vital needs and resources
of mankind. 123

There are several requisites for the formation of a world community. One is that individuals must perceive themselves as citizens not only of their states, but of a world community. They must
feel a responsibility for what occurs elsewhere, just as they do for
what occurs in their states. "It would make a difference to the possibilities of international order if people in Maine should feel the
same degree of responsibility toward the people of Japan or Chile
or Indo-China as they feel towards California," wrote Ronald
Dore. 124 But most individuals still distinguish their own nationals
and foreigners as "us" and "them" and place a higher priority on
the welfare of the "us."
The International Law and Policy of Human Welfare, in THE FOUNDA111, 118-120 (1978).
122. C. JENKS, A NEW WORLD OF LAW? A STUDY OF THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (1969).
123. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 114, at 367.
124. Dore, supra note 106, at 413.
121.

Johnston,

TIONS OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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A sense of concern and responsibility may be lacking as well
when governments are called upon to act. It is said that the reason
that the League of Nations was unable to stop Italy's aggression
against Ethiopia was that, while the European states were willing
to condemn it verbally, they were unwilling to take action that
would have been costly to them to stop a wrong that had occurred
in a distant location. 126 De Visscher wrote in 1953 that there was
on the part of states only a "very weak perception of common
good" that "prevents us from speaking of an international community as something already established. m 26 He cautioned against
concluding that a "social community" existed at the world level
simply "because it would be socially good to have it so." 127 Within
states it took a long period of time for individuals to develop a
sense of citizenry in the state, as opposed to a loyalty to village,
locality, or clan. Indeed, in many places, particularly in Africa and
the Middle East, where states are still recent phenomena, that
shift in loyalty is far from completed. A world outlook, however, is
necessary if global problems are to be addressed effectively.
Whether individuals or states can sufficiently develop a worldview outlook, instead of a state-view outlook, is problematic. "The
historical distribution of power has implanted group morals,"
wrote De Visscher, "and the relations that spring from them rest
neither on the perception of an extranational common good nor on
the consciousness of a destiny common to all men. " 128 But citizen
groups, like those pressing for human rights, for peace, and for environmental protection, are urging an "extranational" outlook and
have convinced a wide sector of the public in many states to adopt
such a view.
There has developed a concept that international law must operate to promote the well-being of the world community. This concept is at odds with the nineteenth century view that international
law is whatever stat.es agree to make it, 129 and that moral concerns
are secondary. 130 Sometimes viewed as a return to natural law from
positivism, the twentieth century approach is that law is not simply what states say it is, but that law must promote the general
125. C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 58.
126. Id. at 72. While the English translation was published in 1957, the French original
was published in 1953.
127. See id. at 88.
128. See id. at 95-96. See also Murphy, supra note 29, at 337.
129. C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 51-52; S. KIM, supra note 30, at 33.
130. Brownlie, supra note 39, at 359-60.
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welfare.
This approach was reflected in the statements of political
figures, regarding military conflict situations; their aim was to
achieve peace with justice. During World War I, this idea was associated with President Woodrow Wilson, who saw self-determination of peoples as a prerequisite for a lasting peace. The idea was
also taken up by those who saw in the existing international order
a preservation of a position of domination by wealthier states and
by wealthier individuals within states. The world community, it
was argued, should pursue the goal of equitable distribution of resources. After the demise of political colonialism in Africa and
Asia, the newly independent states took up this notion, arguing for
economic policies at the international level that would allow them
to compete with the developed states. The idea was also framed by
depicting the existing order as inherently unjust, and able to maintain itself only through a kind of systemic violence. 131
XI.

OBSTACLES TO THE EMERGENCE OF A WORLD COMMUNITY

The kind of world community that could cope with survival
issues effectively is only in its nascent stage. There are serious obstacles in the path of its full development. Can a law be developed
for a world community when law around the world is quite diverse? Is culture too diverse to support a common law for the
world? Are political systems too diverse? Are the economic differences between the wealthy and poor states too significant for there
to be the common interests necessary for a world community? Are
states too substantial an obstacle?

A. Diversity of Law
Commonality has long been sought as a basis for international
law. In the seventeenth century, Grotius tried to determine
whether a Europe composed of independent states could support a
law that would be applicable among them. He sought a basis for an
international law in commonalities in the norms followed in European states. 132 When the government of France, in the wake of the
French Revolution, espoused new principles of governance, it was
131. Galtung, A Structural Theory of Imperialism, 8 J. PEACE RES. 81 (1971); Asbjorn
Eide, International Law, Dominance and the Use of Force, 11 J. PEACE RES. 1 (1974) .
132. H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE (A. Campbell trans. 1901, originally
published 1625); Bozeman, Does International Law Have a Future?, 6 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INT 1L &
COMP. L. 289, 290 (1985) .
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feared that a basis for an international law applicable throughout
Europe had been eliminated. In the twentieth century, the question has been raised as to whether international law might have
lost its base of commonality as it expanded beyond Europeanbased societies to include those of Asia, the Middle East and Africa.133 The issue was also raised by representatives of governments
that purported to function on bases different from those of other
states. The Soviet government that came to power in Russia in
1917 said that it was of a new type and that the norms found in
the society it was creating differed from those found in other
states. On that basis, it argued that international law was possible,
as between it and other states, on only a limited basis.
If the differences in legal norms accepted by the various states
are too great, then achieving common solutions through law may
be difficult. While differences are significant, there is on the whole
a remarkable degree of cohesion. That cohesion is in some measure
a product of the industrial revolution. As Wes tern European traders established worldwide networks for the sale of goods in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they took with them concepts
of law necessary for commercial relations. Already in Europe a
common body of commercial custom, called law merchant, had
developed.
As the European powers established colonies in the Americas
and later in south and southeast Asia and in Africa, they enacted
law based on their own. In some cases the European system became nearly exclusive of the indigenous system, as in the Americas,
whereas in others it coexisted with the indigenous system, as was
generally the case in Africa. But even though it did not everywhere
become the exclusive law, European law had a considerable impact. In the early twentieth century, even absent colonization, European law was used in Japan and China as a model for legal reform. During the same period, in the Middle East, Great Britain
and France established a quasi-colonial control and legislated on
their own models.
The unity of European law survived the establishment of the
U.S.S.R. and its allied states in the twentieth century. While introducing new features into their legal systems, these states remained
within the European legal tradition. 134 The legal style and language
of France and Great Britain, the two major nineteenth century col133. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 70-71.
134. Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37
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onizers, came to be that of diplomacy, and continued to be used in
the major multilateral treaties.
B.

Diversity of Culture

Another difficulty in a transition to a world community law is
variance in culture. It has been argued that cultures are too diverse
to support a world system of law. 136 Moreover, in the post-colonial
period, Third World states have strived to maintain their cultures
against Western domination, through such initiatives as the New
International Information Order, whose aim was to combat the
dominance in the news media of a First World outlook. In the Islamic world, religion was reasserted in a way that separated its followers farther from Western culture. 136 Internationally, a certain
commonality of culture exists within elites, largely a Western-derived culture. But outside the West, this culture is not shared beyond the elite groups. 137
Cultural differences have surfaced during many efforts at international regulation. Polygamy is viewed by some as a violation
of the rights of women, while by others it is viewed as a reflection
of certain cultures. The circumcision of young girls, practiced in
many parts of Africa, is widely viewed as a violation of human
rights, but some justify the practice as a reflection of a culture.
On the other hand, there is a certain commonality in seemingly diverse cultures. While nineteenth century Europeans drew a
sharp line between the civilized and uncivilized parts of the world,
with Europe and its settler colonies in the Americas as the civilized
parts, Europe itself had drawn on other cultures to create what it
had become by the time of its industrial revolution. Much of its ·
culture stemmed from ancient Egypt and other parts of the Middle
East. Until the fifteenth century, Spain was under Arab rule.
Mathematics, science, medicine and technology were more advanced there than in northern Europe. Indeed, northern Europe
drew on this Arab learning to create its industrial revolution. Islam, the religion predominating in the Arab world, is a seventh
century offshoot of Christianity.
135. A.

BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD

161-62 (1971);

Boze-

The International Order in a Multicultural World, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 387, 404.
136. Bozeman, The International Order in a Multicultural World, in THE EXPANSION
OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 387, 401.
137. H. BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 317
man,

(1977).
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Law, in either a domestic or international setting, presumes a
certain commonality within the community to which it applies. 138
Communities within states evidence considerable cultural diversity, but support legal orders nonetheless. The cultural diversity
found in states has increased in the twentieth centuries as states
have come to encompass a greater number of persons of different
cultures. The United States received migrants from Europe in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and from Latin America,
Asia, Africa and the Middle East from mid-century. In Africa, European colonizing powers drew borders that divided cultures and
cast groups representing a variety of cultures into a single political
system. Those borders were retained after independence. Despite
having people of widely diverse backgrounds, states have managed
to maintain functioning legal systems.
International law, it has been said, "rests on a distinctive
value foundation that embraces universal human values held in
common by all nations." 139 These values represent what can be
agreed upon, given cultural differences. In view of the need for cooperation, states endeavor to overcome cultural differences that
stand in the way of solutions to pressing problems. 140 Law can
function internationally despite cultural differences. The differences need, however, to be taken into account. For example, Westerners read written agreements such as contracts or treaties quite
literally, while Easterners are more concerned with the spirit underlying the relationship and are less prone to split hairs; this is a
factor to be considered in drafting international agreements, 141 but
it does not eliminate the possibility of agreements.
It is important, finally, that a law for the world community
not exclude populations that desire to be a part of it. Where original inhabitants of a territory no longer exercise political authority,
as in North America or Australia, they must be a part of the community that forms the basis for a world community law, or they
must not be considered bound by it. The danger is that they will
be considered bound, but will have no effective role in formulating
it or administering it.
138. Id.
139. Vereshchetin & Danilenko, Cultural and Ideological Pluralism and International
Law, 29 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 56, 59 (1986).
140. Id. at 58.
141. Dore, University and Diversity in World Culture, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, supra note 39, at 408-09.
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Diversity of Political Systems

It is argued that a community at the world level presupposes a
similarity of domestic political orders. Even the unity that presently exists, it is said, has been possible only because of a certain
political conformity. "[T]he process by which Asian and African
political communities did come to enter into such reciprocal relations and to enjoy full rights as members of international society
was inseparable from domestic processes of political and social reform which narrowed the differences between them and the political communities of the West, and contributed to a process of convergence. " 142 European integration is taken to show that economic
and political integration is possible only on the basis of a commonality in political systems.
Diversity in political orders is likely, however, to remain a feature of the international order for the foreseeable future. While the
European system of parliamentary rule has spread to other areas,
systems that are religion-based or based on monarchy or oligarchy
predominate in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. The Soviet government initially said that only a limited body of international law
could exist between it and other states because of differences in
their domestic political orders, but as the twentieth century
progressed it entered into a wide range of international-legal relations. Both it and its allied Eastern European states, in the 1980s,
moved towards parliamentary rule of the Western European type.
While political similarity facilitates integration at the world
level, it is not a prerequisite for a significant level of integration.
Moreover, as the perception sharpens that international action is
needed to assure survival, differences are likely to be overcome.
D.

Economic Differentials

Another obstacle to a world community is the extreme discrepancy in living standards between the developing and developed states. Those states that underwent an industrial revolution
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are far ahead of those
that did not. Comparing the poorest states to the most affluent,
the literacy rate goes from twenty percent to over ninety-five percent, infant morality (per one thousand live births) from 120 to 20,
the percentage of the population that is malnourished from thirty142. Bull, The Emergence of a Universal International Society, in
supra note 39, at 117, 122.
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five percent to virtually none, and life expectancy from the mid 40s
to the early 70s. 143 The wealth discrepancy between the wealthiest
and the poorest states, moreover, is not diminishing but increasing.
It has grown steadily and substantially over the past century. 144
Large differences in living standards exist, of course, within
individual states, mirroring in some instances the degree of difference between the developed and developing states. While it is not
impossible for rich and poor to exist in the same political system,
the difference imposes a strain. Further, in individual states, no
decision was made for rich and poor to come together; the situation evolved over time. For a rich state, it is difficult to decide on
greater integration with states that may be a drain on their assets,
or whose labor comes cheaper. The entry into the European Economic Community of Spain and Portugal, for example, was difficult because of the two states lower economic levels.
E.

States as an Obstacle

De Visscher viewed the likelihood of the development of a
community at the international level as a function of the type of
state that predominates. "There will be no international community," he said, "so long as the political ends of the State overshadow the human ends of power." 146 He saw the states under national socialism as prone to aggression by manipulating the
citizenry, and thus that they were the "born enemy to international organization. " 146 His point was that states concerned about
their own power are less likely to cede authority in the interest of
creating a better world.
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international
order came to include a larger number of states, as colonialism ended in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This meant that there
were more states to disagree among themselves and made it harder
to achieve international consensus on major issues. 147 At the same
time, however, it had the effect of spreading power and thus
worked against the concentration of power that had existed under
colonialism.
Whereas a state is composed of individuals, over whom it can
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 41.
S. KIM, supra note 30, at 48-49.
C. DE V1sscHER, supra note 109, at 93.
Id. at 123.
Brownlie, supra note 39, at 369.
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exercise authority, the states that compose the international order
have their own powers of decision-making. Even inside states, however, individuals are not equal actors. Some control more resources
and enjoy substantial decision-making power. Large groupings, like
major business corporations, play a role in terms of their influence
that in some ways is comparable to that of states in the international legal order. Just as states and individuals are not on a par in
terms of power in the international legal order, so corporations and
individuals are not on a par in the domestic legal order.
International law has long lived with the disparity in power
among states. That disparity has caused serious strains, and international law has had to accommodate to the disparity, 148 but it has
not prevented the functioning of the system.

XII.

CONCLUSION

There is historical precedent for the proposition that the dramatic social and economic change of the late twentieth century will
lead to a new role for law. The last two major changes in the political-legal order of Europe both occurred at periods of major socioeconomic change. The twelfth century saw the emergence of the
papacy as a political institution and of the modern Western concept of a legal system. 149 This occurred at a time of technological
innovation that transformed productive processes and commerce-rudders on ships, and in agriculture the development of
the harness and a sophisticated plough. 150 The next major politi- .
cal-legal change, which led to state sovereignty and separation of
powers, occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with
the Peace of Westphalia, the English Bill of Rights, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. This change came at the time of
the development of the steam engine and large scale industry, replacing craft production. m
In the latter half of the twentieth century, international law
increased in the scope of relations regulated, and in processes to
effectuate .its norms. As international law reformed itself, the nine148. See, e.g., within the United Nations, the allocation to five states of permanent
seats on the Security Council, and the right of each of veto resolutions on non-procedural
issues. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 23, 27.
149. H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 86-87 (1983).
150. Id. at 520; J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 23; S. LILLEY, MEN, MACHINES AND HISTORY: THE STORY OF TOOLS AND MACHINES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL PROGRESS 49-53 (1966).
151. A. CASSESE, supra note 40, at 34-37; J. DILLOWAY, supra note 21, at 24-25.
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teenth century's bright line between international law and domestic jurisdiction was obliterated. Few realms of domestic legal policy
remained immune from international law. The shifting of power
relations in the late twentieth century, and the diminution of the
superpower conflict as a determinant of international relations, coincided with a perception that the survival of humankind was in
jeopardy. That perception forced states to rethink international relations as a common quest for survival. The diminution of the Cold
War in the 1980s opened the path to superpower cooperation in
resolving the survival issues. Indeed, the superpower conflict that
had defined world politics at mid-century was fading as a united
Europe and Japan advanced economically. Global solutions that
were politically infeasible in the 1970s were realistic by 1990.
The changes and dangers present in contemporary international life require a transcendence of the state as the only decisionmaking unit. While the state will likely retain a substantial role,
increasingly international institutions must set policy, and individuals and non-state groupings must play a role that gives them a
sense of responsibility for the world community. The planet is confronted by problems that cannot be solved by individual states acting separately. If the planet is to support life, solutions must be
devised in common.
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